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I. Introduction

The first stock exchange in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange,
opened in December 1990. Since then, China's securities market has been
on a journey of unprecedented development. However, the fledgling
securities market is troubled by rampant securities fraud, evidenced by
Chinese officials' open admission that investment in China's securities
market is very risky because of fraud and corruption. After a tortuous sixyear drafting process, on December 29, 1998, the Chinese parliament passed
the country's first national Securities Law ("the Chinese Securities Law"),
hoping to regulate the overwhelming fraud and corruption in China's
* Wenyan Ma is an associate with Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York. He graduated from
Fudan University in Shanghai, China, in 1995. He received his LL.B. from Fudan University
Law School in 1997 and his M.C.J. from New York University Law School in 1998. In
1997, Mr. Ma worked in the Freshfields Hong Kong/Shanghai office. The author wishes to
thank Benedict W. Chun, Esq., an associate of Leboeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRac, LLP, and
associate Andrew Tuck, my colleague at Davis Polk & Wardwell, for their invaluable
comments and suggestions on my early drafts. Mistakes are, of course, the author's own
responsibility.
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securities market.' The Chinese Securities Law devoted one entire section
of the Chapter "Securities Trade," entitled "Prohibited Trading Activities,"
to regulate securities fraud.:
Because the Chinese Securities Law is modeled in many ways on
U.S. securities laws, it seems its antifraud scheme also supports a form of
misappropriation theory3, whose validity was only recently affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court.4 This Note will focus on the misappropriation theory
supported by the Chinese Securities Law and make a comparison with the
misappropriation theory under U.S. securities laws. After outlining the
misappropriation theory under U.S. securities laws and the antifraud
provisions of the Chinese Securities Law, this Note will demonstrate that the
Chinese Securities Law supports a form of the misappropriation theory with
a wider scope than its U.S. counterpart. This Note will further argue that (i)
the wider scope of the misappropriation theory under the Chinese Securities
Law will eliminate a loophole in the U.S. misappropriation theory so that it
will better maintain the integrity of the securities market and (ii) the greater
breadth of the Chinese misappropriation theory will probably cover certain
proper securities trading as well. Finally, this Note will recommend that the
Chinese Securities Law adopt the "use" test of the U.S. misappropriation
theory to avoid interference with lawful securities trading.
II. The Misappropriation Theory under U.S. Securities Laws
The U.S. Congress enacted the 1934 Exchange Act as an antifraud
scheme with a major purpose to maintain the integrity of the securities
markets by regulating exchanges and broker-dealers. 5 Section 10(b) 6 of the
1934 Exchange Act, together with Rule 1Ob-5 7 promulgated by the United
1The main goal of the Chinese Securities Law is to "standardize the issuing and trading of
securities, to protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, to safeguard the social and
economic order and the public interest and to promote the development of the socialist
market economy." PRC, SECURrrmEs LAW 3700/98.12.29 [P.RC. SEC. L.] art. 1. (CUNA LAW
& PRACTICE, Feb. 1999, at 25) (P.R.C.).
2 See "Prohibited Trading Acts," P.R.C. SEC. L. art. 67-77 (CHINA LAw & PRACTICE, Feb.

1999, at 38-41).
3 An insider trading theory for Rule 1Ob-5 liability under the Exchange Act and SEC rules.
See O'Hagan v. United States, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
4 See id. at 653.
5Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. §78(k) (1994).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) (prohibiting the "use or employ[ment], in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security .... [of) any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe.").
7See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1996) (Rule lOb-5 states in pertinent part that it shall be illegal
for any person "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.., in connection with
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States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") thereunder, represents
the principal federal law of insider trading. A chargeable conduct under
Section 10(b) must involve (1) a "deceptive device or contrivance;" and (2)
the use of such device "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities. 8
Relying on the common law's definition of fraud which permits
nondisclosure in the absence of a duty to disclose, the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized the need for a breach of fiduciary duty to constitute lOb-5
liability. 9 The Court held that "a duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does0
not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.'
Currently, insider trading liability requires a breach of fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of the issuer or to the source of the information.l" These two
grounds for liability represent, respectively, the classical insider trading
theory and the misappropriation theory.
Under the classical insider trading theory, a corporate insider
violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 if he trades in the security of his
corporation on the basis of material nonpublic information. In such a case,
the insider breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation
that arises from the relationship of trust and confidence between the
shareholder and the insider. 12 While "corporate insiders" traditionally
included directors, officers and other employees of a corporation, 13 the
Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC 14 expanded insider trading
liability to include "temporary insiders," that is, those who perform services
for a public company where the relationship entails receipt
of inside
15
information that the client expects to be kept confidential.
Under the misappropriation theory, one who misappropriates
the purchase or sale of a security").
'See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
9See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
'°See id.
" See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
2 In doing so, the insider has employed a "deceptive device." See id.
13See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (196 l)(asserting that "an affirmative
duty to disclose material information has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,'
particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders").
14463 U.S. 646 (1983).
5
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, n. 14. (stating that "[u]nder certain circumstances, such as
where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer,
or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders").

36

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LA WAND BUSINESS

[Vol. 1:1

confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information also violates Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.16 The misappropriation theory is usually referred to
as the "fraud on the source" theory 17 because the victim of the breach, the
source of the information, is a person separate from the holders of the
securities of the corporation with whom the insider trades.
Reaffirming the breach of fiduciary duty as a necessary element for
liability under Rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court in O 'Hagan'1 upheld the
misappropriation theory 19 because the agent breached the fiduciary duty
owed to the source of information; that is, the duty not to use the material,
nonpublic information for secret profit when he traded securities based on
that information.2" The O'Hagan court treated the classical theory and the

misappropriation theory as "complementary, each addressing efforts to
capitalize on
nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of
21
securities."
The difference between the two theories can be illustrated by the
following simple example of a lawyer's representation of the bidder in an
imminent merger of two companies. If the lawyer trades the securities of the
bidder based on material nonpublic information related to the merger,
classical insider trading liability will be triggered because the lawyer is an
insider of the bidder. However, if the lawyer trades the securities of the
target based on material nonpublic information related to the merger, he will
be subject to insider trading liabilities under the misappropriation theory

because he breached the fiduciary duty owed to the source of the
information, the bidder, not the duty owed to the target company.
HI. The Misappropriation Theory under the Chinese Securities Law
The anti-fraud scheme under the Chinese Securities Law resembles
16See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
17See id at 682 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

18See id
19The federal courts were divided over the legality of the misappropriation theory until it
was finally upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan. Compare SEC
v Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990)(asserting that "misappropriation and use of
confidential information in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty amounts to fraud within the
meaning of the statute"), and SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)(stating that "misappropriation, has been adopted in several circuits"), with United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949 (4th Cir. 1995)(finding that the "misappropriation theory
cannot be defended"), and United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 965 (4th Cir.
1995)(reversing conviction and sentence for securities fraud and refusing to adopt the
misappropriation theory).
20 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
21

id.
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that of the U.S. regime. Article 70 of the Chinese Securities Law prohibits
(1) informed persons with the knowledge of inside information (corporate
insiders) from trading the securities of the corporation; 22 (2) any other person
who has illegally obtained inside information (misappropriators) from
trading the securities of the corporation on which he has inside information;
and (3) insiders and misappropriators from divulging such information or
counseling another person to trade such securities.2 3
In prohibiting anyone who has acquired inside information through
illegal measures from trading it for secret profit, Item (2) of Article 70
essentially supports the misappropriation theory because it focuses on the
way in which the trader acquires the information, rather than the relationship
between the misappropriator and the traded corporation. Further, because it
does not require a fiduciary relationship between the misappropriator and the
source of the information, its scope is potentially wider than the O'Hagan
misappropriation theory.
IV. The Wider Scope of the Misappropriation Theory under the
Chinese Securities Law is a Desirable One
The O'Haganmisappropriation theory is narrower than the theory suggested
by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, which was the seed of the
misappropriation theory.24 Unlike the O'HaganCourt, which put emphasis
on the breach of fiduciary duty to the source of information, the Chief Justice
found that the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 supported a reading
that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. 25 The
difference between the two theories is significant because the O'Hagan
misappropriation theory allows a trader to escape liability either if he does
not have a fiduciary duty to the source of the information or if he discloses
22

Item (1) essentially supports the same classic insider trading theory as U.S. securities laws
since the concept of "corporate insider", as defined in Article 68 of the Chinese Securities
Law, is also wide enough to include "temporary insiders." See P.1C. SEc. L.art. 68 (CHNA
LAw & PRACrICE, Feb. 1999, at 38-39).
23Item (3) essentially supports "tippee" and "tipper" liability, which was established in

Dirks. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662-664; P.R.C. Sec. L. art. 70 (CHiNA LAW & PRACTICE,
Feb. 1999, at 39-40).
24
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241-42 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
25

See id.,
at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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his trading activities to the source.
The liability framework in Article 70 of the Chinese Securities Law
resembles Chief Justice Burger's theory, because anyone who has gained
information through illegal measures is absolutely prohibited from trading
in the securities of that corporation. 7 This theory is more logical than the
O'Hagantheory because it depends on the way in which the misappropriator
receives the information, not the person from whom he receives such
information, that determines the duty to disclose or abstain from trading. As
one commentator has written: "[T]he way in which the buyer acquires
information which he conceals from the vendor should be a material
circumstance.

28

By eliminating the fiduciary duty element,2 9 the Chinese
misappropriation theory will fix a loophole in the O'Haganmisappropriation
theory. First, problems abound in determining what constitutes a fiduciary
relationship. In United States v. Chestman,30 the tipper learned of certain
material nonpublic information from his wife, who did not demand
confidentiality, and it formed the basis for trading before the information
became public. 31 The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the marital
relationship was not itself a sufficient basis upon which the misappropriation
theory would operate. 32 By contrast, in United States v. Willis 33, where a
psychiatrist traded on information that his patient shared with him during
one of their sessions, the court found that the psychiatrist breached the
physician's duty of confidentiality when he misappropriated non-public
business information confided to him by his patient for her psychiatric
diagnosis and treatment.34 Whether the misappropriator and the source of
information have a fiduciary relationship is not an easy question to answer.
26
27

See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-55.
A duty to disclose is essential to common law fraud. If there is no duty to disclose,

nondisclosure will not result in fraud. Under the classical theory and the O'Hagan
misappropriation theory, a fiduciary relationship is required because that is from where the
duty to disclose arises. However, under the misappropriation theory suggested by Chief
Justice Burger, the misappropriator has an absolute duty to disclose so that a fiduciary
relationship is not an issue here. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28 W. Page Keeton, Fraud, Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25
(1936).
29 Or, it can be argued that the fiduciary duty element is automatically satisfied since,
according to Chief Justice Burger, the misappropriator owes to marketplace traders an
absolute duty to disclose-or-abstain once he misappropriated nonpublic material information.
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
30 704 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), reh 'g en banc, 947
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1759 (1992).
31See United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 77-78 (1990).
32
See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (1992)(en banc).
33737 F. Supp. 269, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), mot.denied, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
14See Willis, 737 F.Supp. at 274.
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Second, from the perspective of market participants, the
deceptiveness of trading on misappropriated information will not change
regardless of whether the misappropriator has a fiduciary relationship with
the source of information or whether the misappropriator discloses his
trading activities to the source before he trades. The misappropriator has an
illegally obtained advantage that would have existed even if he had not owed
a fiduciary duty to the source of information or even if he had disclosed his
activities to the source. For the purposes of a marketplace securities
exchange, the existence of a fiduciary duty between the misappropriator and
the source of the information is irrelevant. Likewise, the disclosure of the
misappropriator to the source of information does not eliminate the
fraudulent element of the securities transaction between the marketplace
traders and the misappropriator.
Finally, public policy concerns support the broader scope of
misappropriation theory under Chinese Securities Law. In Chiarella,Chief
Justice Burger, based on a public policy rationale, interpreted section 10(b)
extraordinarily broadly to "reach any person engaged in any fraudulent
scheme., 35 As the O'Hagan Court noted, if the market is thought to be
systematically populated with transactors trading on the basis of
misappropriated information, some investors will refrain from dealing
altogether, and others will incur costs to overcome their unavoidable
informational disadvantages. 6
For the development of the fledgling Chinese securities market,
China's Securities Law, just as the history of the U.S. statutes and rules
suggest, should prohibit "those manipulative and deceptive practices which
have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful finction."3 7 Since the
misappropriators' securities trading on the basis of misappropriated
nonpublic information serves no useful function, resulting in the unjust
enrichment at the expense of others, an absolute duty should be imposed on
the misappropriators prohibiting them from trading on any nonpublic
material information.
In short, the misappropriation theory under Chinese Securities Law,
similar to that suggested by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella,will better
maintain the integrity of the security market than the current
35
36 See

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See 0' Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659.

37

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep.No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 6 (1934)).
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misappropriation theory under U.S. Security Law in that: (1) the theory
avoids the troublesome fiduciary duty question which will lead to more
consistent outcomes; (2) the theory follows naturally from the equity concern
of the securities laws and regulations; and (3) the theory is consistent with
public policies.
V. Caveat: Wider is not Always Better
In the U.S., prior to O 'Hagan,the issue of whether insider trading
requires mere possession of material nonpublic information or actual use of
such information while trading in securities was not definitively resolved.
Although this issue was not before the O'Hagan Court because O 'Hagan's
use of material nonpublic information to purchase securities was undisputed,
the Court, in dictum, arguably required the affirmative "use" of
misappropriated information in a securities transaction, rather than merely
trading while "possessing" such information in order to establish inside
trading liability.38
By contrast, Article 70 of the Chinese Securities Law prohibits any
person who has illegally obtained inside information from buying or selling
securities of the company of which he has inside information.3 9 This
approach supports insider trading liability for trading securities based on
"possession" of inside information. By adopting the "possession" test, the
Chinese Securities Law again supports the misappropriation theory on a
wider, although undesirable scope.
The "possession" test may prohibit actions that are not themselves
fraudulent per se because insider trading, although it involves possession of
material nonpublic information, does not invariably and inevitably result in
a breach of the duty to disclose or abstain from trading. In actuality, the
"possession" test may lead to flawed results. For example, where an insider
is a party to a binding executory contract to buy and sell securities in his
company on a predetermined periodic basis, such a contract to trade would
have to be breached under the "possession" test when the insider merely
came into possession of material nonpublic information through illegal
measures despite the fact that the misappropriator's decision to buy or sell
his securities was never based on such inside information. As a
commentator noted, it strains common usage to say the executives in the
38

See, e.g., O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (stating that "[ a ] misappropriator who trades on the

basis of material nonpublic information.., gains his advantageous market position through
deception...") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); id. at 656 (stating that "the fiduciary's
fraud is consummated...when, without disclosure to the principal, he uses the information
to
purchase or sell securities.") (emphasis added).
39
P.R.C. SEC. L. art. 70 (CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Feb. 1999, at 39-40).
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hypothetical "take advantage of the inside information when they passively
allow a previous decision to be implemented. ''4
A strong argument can be made that a strict "use" test would pose
serious difficulties of proof for Chinese securities regulatory authorities,
which have limited experience in enforcement of insider trading liabilities.
It is true that the motivations for the trader's decision to trade are difficult
to prove because they remain solely within the trader's knowledge.
However, as a U.S. court observed, the proof difficulty therein is sufficiently
alleviated by the inference of use that arises from the fact that an insider
traded while in possession of inside information. 41 Executory contract
situations, such as the above hypothetical, impose no practical difficulty
upon a court to conclude that there is no actual "use" of inside information
in such securities transactions. 42
VI. Conclusion
With the aim of eliminating market fraud and corruption, the
Chinese Securities Law has put considerable emphasis on the prohibition of
insider trading. It supports a form of misappropriation theory similar to the
misappropriation theory under U.S. securities laws.
While the misappropriation theory under U.S. securities laws bases
securities fraud liability on a breach of fiduciary duty,43 the misappropriation
theory under the Chinese Securities Law places emphasis on the illegal
measures employed to gain the inside information resulting in a
misappropriation theory with broader scope. By eliminating the fiduciary
duty element, the Chinese misappropriation theory avoids the inconsistencies
arising from the implementation of the U.S. misappropriation theory and
better maintains the integrity of the security market.
However, the Chinese misappropriation theory prohibits trading
with possession of inside information. Because such a theory does not
require the insider's actual use of the inside information, the over-broad
insider trading liabilities may result in unnecessary interference with proper
securities trading such as a preexisting plan to buy or sell. Therefore, the
40 Allan Horwich, PossessionVersus Use: Is There a CausationElement in the Prohibition

on Insider Trading?,52 Bus. Law. 1235, 1274 (1997).
41See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (1998).
42See id.

43See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
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Chinese misappropriation theory should adopt the "use" test for insider
trading liability.

